+ KifRt^RIt^RIt^RIt^RIHt]P !]4t] !RR04t ]P!R4t RRlt RR ltR#) usURL safety checks — blocks requests to private/internal network addresses. Prevents SSRF (Server-Side Request Forgery) where a malicious prompt or skill could trick the agent into fetching internal resources like cloud metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254), localhost services, or private network hosts. Limitations (documented, not fixable at pre-flight level): - DNS rebinding (TOCTOU): an attacker-controlled DNS server with TTL=0 can return a public IP for the check, then a private IP for the actual connection. Fixing this requires connection-level validation (e.g. Python's Champion library or an egress proxy like Stripe's Smokescreen). - Redirect-based bypass in vision_tools is mitigated by an httpx event hook that re-validates each redirect target. Web tools use third-party SDKs (Firecrawl/Tavily) where redirect handling is on their servers. N)urlparsezmetadata.google.internalz metadata.googz 100.64.0.0/10cnV^8dQhR\P\P,R\/#)ipreturn) ipaddress IPv4Address IPv6Addressbool)formats"-/home/ubuntu/hermes-agent/tools/url_safety.py __annotate__r &s+  y,,y/D/DD  cVP'g7VP'g%VP'gVP'dR#VP'gVP 'dR#V\ 9dR#R#)z %sTu5Blocked request — URL safety check error for %s: %s)rhostnamestriplower_BLOCKED_HOSTNAMESloggerwarningsocket getaddrinfo AF_UNSPEC SOCK_STREAMgaierrorr ip_address ValueErrorr Exception) rparsedr addr_infofamily_sockaddrip_strrexcs & r is_safe_urlr22s< (#OO))r00288: ) ) NNEx P **8T6;K;KVM_M_`I*3 %FAq!a[F ))&1b!!K*3)  NNNPX Y      NPSY svE&E !E-5C<"E6D. EE8E<+D+'E*D++E. D=9E<D==E E, E''E,)__doc__rloggingr# urllib.parser getLogger__name__r! frozensetr ip_networkrrr2rr r;s\" !   8 $ %%o6 .r